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FROM THE STREET TO THE COURTROOM: THE
LEGALIZATION OF GRAFFITI ART
Meredith Burtin*
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, real estate developer Gerald Wolkoff enlisted renowned graffiti
artist Jonathan Cohen to turn a group of run-down warehouse buildings Wolkoff
owned in Long Island City, New York into an exhibition area for artists.1 Acting
as curator, Cohen recruited other street artists to rent studio spaces in Wolkoff’s
buildings, and they quickly filled the walls with numerous pieces of artwork, which
were often the subject of pertinent social and cultural issues.2 Depending on the
visual outcome and popularity of the piece, some works became permanent
fixtures, while others existed just temporarily and were painted over by other artists
in a process known as “creative destruction.”3
The site, which became known as 5Pointz, housed over 10,600 works of
art throughout its existence.4 It lay in clear view to travelers using the 7-subway
line, and it drew the attention of daily visitors, celebrities, and various media
outlets.5 The artwork eventually gained world-wide recognition among artists, art
enthusiasts, and casual viewers alike; 5Pointz became a “cultural landmark” in
New York, cultivating a strong community focused on celebrating and developing
hip-hop, youth, and art culture.6
The large-scale graffiti showcase essentially gentrified the city, leading
Wolkoff to pursue municipal approval in May 2013 to demolish the buildings and
replace them with multimillion-dollar luxury apartments.7 Upon learning of
Wolkoff’s intentions, Cohen and several other 5Pointz artists filed a lawsuit
against the property owner in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York to save their work from devastation.8 They sued under the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)9, a federal statute that awards visual artists
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1
Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2020).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See Bruce Wallace, Remembering 5Pointz: A Five-Story Building That Told Plenty More, NPR
(Nov. 21, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/11/21/246549375/remembering-5pointz-afive-story-building-that-told-plenty-more.
6
Id.; see generally Eli Anapur, The Legendary 5 Pointz - History and Legacy, WIDEWALLS (Nov.
15, 2016), https://www.widewalls.ch/magazine/5-pointz.
7
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 162.
8
Id. at 163.
9
17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990).
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certain “moral rights” in their art in order to maintain the integrity and reputation
of their work and names.10
In November of the same year, the district court issued a minute order
denying the plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction but also giving
notice that a full written opinion would soon follow.11 In the eight days between
the minute order and the issue of the opinion, Wolkoff whitewashed the art from
the site in frustration.12 Judge Frederic Block expressed regret in his opinion for
failing to find a plausible legal avenue to grant the preliminary injunction.13 Yet,
because Judge Block also emphasized the potential for monetary damages under
VARA, Cohen amended and later consolidated his complaint with nine additional
artists who sued Wolkoff for intentional destruction of their work.14
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
decision in Castillo is the first case to legally recognize the artistic and cultural
value of graffiti or street art. Graffiti can be traced as far back as ancient Grecian
times, but its emergence in the United States as the type of contemporary art
recognized among ordinary citizens today began in the late 1950s.15 Through the
following decades, graffiti artists individualized and refined their artistic styles,
often creating their art to address relevant cultural and societal issues.16 Graffiti
can be found today in neighborhoods of all classes, as well as in revered art
galleries and exhibits.17 Several cities even host events honoring graffiti as an
important form of creative expression.18 For example, the city of St. Louis hosts
an annual event called “Paint Louis” that draws artists from around the world to
celebrate graffiti and hip-hop culture.19 Kansas City, Missouri also holds the
“SpraySeeMO Mural Festival” each year as a similar type of artistic celebration.20
Regardless, many people still perceive graffiti artists solely as criminals
and their art as a sheer nuisance, due in part to the art’s disfavored history within
the United States legal system.21 The type of graffiti protected by Castillo,
however, is notably distinct from the type criminalized by several states. Castillo
protects graffiti created with permission of the property owner—not in an act of
vandalism. The decision distinguishes the two categories and announces to the
general public what a large community of contemporary artists and art enthusiasts
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163.
Id. at 163; Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
12
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163.
13
Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
14
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163.
15
Marisa A. Gómez, Note, The Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions Through Distinguishing
Graffiti Art from Graffiti Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 636-37 (1993).
16
Id. at 637-39.
17
Id. at 641.
18
See generally Carol Guttery, Your Guide to Great Global Street Art & Mural Festivals: 2020
Edition, WAYFARING VIEWS (Nov. 22, 2019), https://wayfaringviews.com/street-art-mural-festivals/.
19
Jimmy Bernhard, Our Beautiful City: Paint Louis Graffiti Wall, KSDK (June 3, 2016, 1:02 PM),
https://www.ksdk.com/article/features/our-beautiful-city-paint-louis-graffiti-wall/23025649.
20
See SpraySeeMO Mural Festival, SPRAYSEEMO, https://www.sprayseemo.com/about (last
visited July 24, 2020).
21
See Al Roundtree, Note, Graffiti Artists “Get Up” in Intellectual Property’s Negative Space, 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959, 964 (2013).
10
11
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realized about graffiti and other forms of street art decades ago: these works are,
in fact, art, and they offer value to our society.
Though ultimately positive, the outcome of the Castillo decision is rare.
The artists’ only avenue for asserting a claim was by way of a federal statute
(VARA) that affords purposefully limited protection. Compared to other
international moral rights legislation, VARA’s impact is strained in several ways.
Namely, VARA significantly limits the types of works eligible for protection,22
along with the specific moral rights afforded to those works.23
This Comment focuses on the impact of the Castillo decision and how it
should drive legislative change for increased protection of art in the United States.
It also illustrates the differences between the Visual Artists Rights Act and similar
international legislation, which provides guidance for how to adequately amend
the current provisions in VARA. Part I discusses the progression of moral rights
through history as they originated in Europe and achieved recognition in the United
States decades later. Part II then analyzes the Visual Artists Rights Act through
explanations of specific provisions, legislative history, and statutory interpretation
in its limited case law. It also evaluates the statute against current moral rights
legislation in other countries. Next, Part III explores the procedural history and
holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in
Castillo. Finally, Part IV explains why Castillo should mark a deserved victory for
the 5Pointz artists but should also motivate the expansion of moral rights
protection in the United States. Instead of simply adding to an already conflicting
area of case law, Castillo, along with foreign moral rights legislation, demonstrates
why change to the Visual Artists Rights Act is necessary to provide for more
sufficient moral rights protection in the United States.
I. MORAL RIGHTS HISTORY LEADING TO VARA
At the center of Castillo lies a debate surrounding the moral rights of the
5Pointz artists. Moral rights, originating as le droit moral in early nineteenthcentury France, arise from the idea that artists infuse a part of themselves or their
personalities into their work; the cultural and fundamental significance of the work
and its creator—as reflections of diversity and human interests of the time—
justifies its legal protection.24 These rights derive not from the economic value of
the work, but from the “spirit” the artist injects into the art during the creation
process.25
In contrast, American copyright law has historically limited artists’
protection to only economic rights, favoring the production of art and other works
for utilitarian purposes of maximizing societal value and benefit.26 The United
States Constitution affords to Congress the “power . . . to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1990).
§ 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B).
24
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
25
Id.
26
Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 296 (7th Cir. 2011).
22
23
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exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”27 Congress’s right to
authorize this monopoly incentivizes artists and other authors to produce creative
works in order to achieve such recognition and protection, so long as their creations
serve the public good.28
While the United States’ interest in affording copyrights has continued
throughout history to rest mainly in their societal benefit, increased difficulty in
balancing this interest with that of the specific author or artist has stimulated the
enactment of several federal copyright statute amendments.29 Advancements in
technology and the ability to produce works unforeseen to Congress when it wrote
the Constitution have also driven the creation of these amendments, which now
primarily govern this area of intellectual property law.30
The Copyright Act of 1976 currently operates as the principal source of
copyright law, essentially taking the place of the Copyright Act of 1909.31 This
1976 Act allows copyright protection for “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression.”32 Copyright owners mainly hold a right to
exclude others from using their work in certain ways, such as reproducing the
work, preparing derivative works, and distributing copies of the work to the
public.33 These “exclusive rights” do not award the holder of the copyright full
control over the use of their work, but owners are entitled to remedies if someone
else infringes upon their rights.34 However, another’s “fair use of a copyrighted
work,” for purposes like “criticism, comment, news reporting…scholarship, or
research” does not qualify as a copyright infringement.35
The Copyright Act of 1976 continued to highly value the economic
interests of creators, but it also marked at least a small step for the United States in
the direction of stronger collaboration with the intellectual property laws of France

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly
privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.”); see also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127 (1932).
29
Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 429.
30
Id. at 431.
31
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660, 1976 WL 14045.
32
Section 102 of the Copyright Act lists the following categories of works of authorship: (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (1990).
33
§ 106.
34
Section 504 of the Copyright Act defines the remedies for infringement:(a) In General—Except as
otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of copyright is liable for either— (1) the copyright
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c). § 504.
35
§ 107.
27
28
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and other Berne Convention-adhering countries.36 The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, also known as the Berne Convention,
was adopted in 1886 primarily in an effort to establish a basis for international
intellectual property law standards.37 It also aimed to recognize and protect the
copyrights of artists and authors in all countries that are members of the Berne
Union.38 Though other countries gradually joined the Berne Union, the United
States refused to do so for many years in large part due to conflicting principles of
copyright “duration and formalities.”39 A particular area of contention about the
Berne Convention for the United States was Article 6bis,40 which guarantees artists
and authors certain moral rights in their work in accordance with several European
and other international countries’ ideals.41
However, Congress introduced four bills in 1987 to amend national
copyright law and allow the United States to join the Berne Union.42 The Senate
and House of Representatives officially enacted legislation to implement the Berne
Convention in 1988,43 particularly because of interests in global trade and several
revisions made to the Berne Convention targeting American accession.44
II. VARA VERSUS INTERNATIONAL MORAL RIGHTS LAWS
A. Works Eligible for Protection
As a result of the United States’ accession to the Berne Convention,
Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)45 in 1990 to further

36
Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, J. L. & TECH. 71,
75 (1988) (“With the revision of Berne at Rome (1928) and Brussels (1948), and the failure of several
United States revision efforts aimed at permitting United States adherence to Berne, the two paths
would not even begin to converge in material ways until the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act.”).
37
Id. at 72.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 75.
40
Article 6bis reads: “(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.…(3) The means of redress for safeguarding
the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection
is claimed.” Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–27 (1986).
41
Oman, supra note 36, at 80. (“Apart from the economic rights of authors in their works and the
permissible limitations upon such rights, the Berne Convention also provides for “moral rights,”'
which encompass a variety of specific interests authors have with respect to public utilization of their
works. These interests are more in the nature of artistic and professional integrity than pure
commercialism. The recognition and progressive elaboration of the moral rights of the author is and
has long been one of the most distinctive features of the Berne Convention.”)
42
Id. at 71.
43
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. 4262, 100th Cong., 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(enacted).
44
Oman, supra note 36, at 105.
45
§ 106A.
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comply with obligations under the Berne Convention.46 Similar to Article 6bis,
VARA recognizes and defends some moral rights of visual artists in their work.47
While VARA may seemingly indicate a significant development in American
copyright law, its adoption of moral rights is purposely limited and infrequently
applied. The statute prescribes that its stipulated moral rights do not apply to or
protect “any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work” that does
not qualify as a “work of visual art.”48 This classification of a “work of visual
art”—effectively, the scope of the Visual Artists Rights Act—is perhaps the most
limiting part of the statute. Only “visual art” as specifically outlined by Congress
is eligible for protection. The definition also only applies to work that falls into an
even narrower group of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” protected by the
Copyright Act.49
Congress explicitly defined a work of visual art both by what it is and what
it is not. Paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and still photographic images,
when produced solely for exhibition purposes, qualify as “works of visual art.”50
Conversely, posters, maps, charts, applied art, advertising materials, works made
for hire, audiovisual works, literary works, and motion pictures, among other types
of works, do not qualify for moral rights protection as “visual art.”51
Whether these excluded works are openly named in or discreetly omitted
from the statute, VARA’s exclusions seemingly outnumber its inclusions,
especially in relation to comparable international laws. For example, French
copyright law stipulates that an author of “a work of the mind” shall enjoy in that
work “an exclusive incorporeal property right which shall be enforceable against
all persons.”52 This exclusive right “include[s] attributes of an intellectual and
moral nature as well as attributes of an economic nature.”53 Some “works of the
mind” enumerated in the statutory language include the following: literary, artistic,
and scientific writings; dramatic musical works; lectures and sermons;
cinematographic works; architectural, geographic, and topographic works; and
even applied art.54
German and Italian copyright laws largely mimic their French counterpart,
protecting moral rights of authors of many similar literary, scientific, and artistic

H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6920, 1990 WL 258818.
Id.
48
§ 106A(c)(3).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 at 6921.
50
§ 101.
51
“A work of visual art does not include– (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing,
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper,
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material
or container; (iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made
for hire; or (C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.” Id.
52
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] [INTELLECTUAL PROP. CODE] art. L111-1 (Fr.),
translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE (WIPO 2003).
53
Id.
54
Id. at art. L112-2.
46
47
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works.55 The German Copyright Act indicates that its protected artistic works
include architectural works, applied art, and drafts of such work.56 It also extends
safeguards not only to photographic and cinematographic works, but also to other
works “produced by processes similar to” photography and cinematography.57
Moreover, the Italian Copyright Act awards moral rights security to “literary,
dramatic, scientific, didactic and religious works, whether in written or oral
form.”58 Thus, the scope of international moral rights protection is much broader
than VARA and applies to all copyrightable work instead of merely a narrow
group.
VARA also lists other exceptions for the extension of moral rights.59 One
exception explains that modified or mutilated works will not be protected by
VARA when such modification resulted from “the passage of time or the inherent
nature of the materials.”60 Modifications caused by conservation or public
presentation, “including lighting and placement . . . of the work” also fall outside
of the scope of VARA’s protection, “unless the modification is caused by gross
negligence.”61
Further, many of VARA’s terms were left undefined and, therefore, open
to wide and sometimes conflicting interpretation from courts—courts that also
have little experience or comfort extending moral rights to claimants in the United
States. In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, the court addressed whether sculpture
installations within a commercial building’s lobby constituted applied art, so as to
be excluded from VARA’s protection.62 The court held that even though parts of
the sculptures were attached to areas of the lobby that served solely utilitarian
purposes, the work nevertheless was not applied art.63 Holding to the contrary
“would render meaningless VARA’s protection for works of visual art installed in
buildings.”64 Thus, even if a work incorporates features serving utilitarian
purposes, it may still be protected by the statute if the piece as a whole constitutes
visual art.65 However, after Carter, the court in Cheffins v. Stewart denied a claim
for an artistically converted school bus through analysis of applied art.66 It
characterized the work as applied art because the bus still functioned as a vehicle,
even though it had been modified by extensive artistic work.67 The analysis in
Cheffins strained the applicability of VARA by adopting the following standard:
“where a functional object, despite claims of artistic merit, continues to serve a
55
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [URHG] [ACT ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS] Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL
I at 1273, § 2 (Ger.).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
LEGGE 22 aprile 1941, n.633, art. 2 (It.).
59
See § 106A(c)(1)-(3).
60
§ 106A(c)(1).
61
§ 106A(c)(2).
62
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995).
63
Id. at 85.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 2016).
67
Id.
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utilitarian purpose, it is applied art.”68
In Pollara v. Seymour, a hand-painted banner was excluded from
protection because it was made for hire and effectively served as an advertising
material.69 The court explained that “protection of a work under VARA will often
depend . . . upon the work’s objective and evident purpose.”70 Even works that
would otherwise be considered visual art under the statute can be excluded based
on their intended meaning.71 In Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, a VARA claim
to prevent the removal and relocation of multiple commissioned sculptural and
landscape works from a park was denied.72 The court concluded that the works
qualified as site-specific art—art created for a specific location that is itself an
element of the work.73 The court explicitly recognized that this type of art
“unmistakably enriches our culture and the beauty of our public spaces,” but
nonetheless denied protection because the plain language of the statute does not
reference site-specific art.74
Allowing for even more ambiguity in VARA’s application, Congress
indicated in its analysis of the statute that “common sense and generally accepted
standards of the artistic community” should guide courts when determining
whether a work is protected under VARA.75 Yet, the common sense of an artist
likely differs greatly from the common sense of a United States court of law. Even
if artistic standards are to be applied, only a court—not the artistic community—
has the power to actually enter a judgment. Congress also noted that the “medium
or materials used” to create a work shall not be determinative of its status under
the statute, further complicating a court’s analysis of specific works.76
Though limited, claims arising under the Visual Artists Rights Acts can
differ greatly depending on the part of the statute at issue. Regardless of the type
of claim, courts have shown reluctance to extend protection to works that do not
obviously fit within Congress’s restricted definition of “visual art.” In
summarizing the purpose of the statute, Congress noted that VARA is “a pragmatic
response to a real problem . . . . We should always remember that the visual arts
covered by this bill meet a special societal need, and their protection and
preservation serve an important public interest.”77 This “important public interest”
may be more difficult to discern when considering that some works expressly or
otherwise precluded from moral rights protection under VARA often are afforded
such protection in other countries. While the statute does provide needed
protection for some art, the burden for proving worthiness of VARA’s safeguards
is steep.
Id. at 594.
Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 2003).
70
Id. at 269.
71
See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2006).
72
Id. at 137.
73
Id. at 140.
74
Id. at 143.
75
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921, 1990 WL 258818.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 6915-16.
68
69
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B. Infringements
If a work of art does fall within the narrow scope of eligibility for VARA,
the artist can receive some moral rights protection for the work. This protection,
though, is restricted in its reach. The federal statute amended the Copyright Act,
but copyright registration is not a requirement for filing a VARA claim.78 Rights
under VARA exist independently of any copyright in a work of art.79 However,
both copyright and statutory requirements must be met in order to collect damages
under VARA. For reference, a claim for VARA relief was unsuccessful in Kelley
v. Chicago Park District because an artist’s wildflower garden located in a city
park did not meet requirements under copyright law. It was not adequately fixated
or attributable to an author, since natural forces were largely responsible for its
appearance.80
Generally, moral rights are classified by four unique rights: attribution,
integrity, withdrawal, and disclosure.81 The right of attribution affords artists the
ability to claim their work as their own and to prevent others from doing so.82 The
right of integrity allows artists to prevent the mutilation, modification, distortion
(and sometimes even destruction) of their work.83 The right of withdrawal dictates
artists’ ability to modify or retract a work after publication.84 Finally, the right of
disclosure enables artists to decide whether, when, and how a work will be
published.85 Countries vary as to which moral rights they affirm in their legislation.
France, Germany, and Italy, for example, provide all four of these rights to authors
of works that qualify for protection.86 In the Visual Artists Rights Act, the United
States specifies moral rights protection only for the rights of attribution and
integrity.87
For the specific purposes of VARA, the right of attribution allows artists
to claim rightful authorship of and recognition for their artwork.88 Artists can also
prevent their names from being attributed to another’s work or to their own work
that has been mutilated or modified in such a way that would cause harm to their

Id. at 6931-32; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
§ 106A(a).
80
Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011).
81
Cynthia Esworthy, A Guide to the Visual Artists Rights Act, NEA OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON
AND
LEE
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/martin/art_law/esworthy.htm.
82
Id.
83
§ 106A(a)(2).
84
Esworthy, supra note 81.
85
Id.
86
JEAN-MATHIEU BERTHO & AURÉLIE ROBERT, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION IN FRANCE: OVERVIEW,
Thomas Reuters Practical Law (database updated Oct. 2018); 2 VALERIA FALCE ET AL., INT’L
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE ITA § 7 (Paul Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed.,
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 31st ed. 2019); 2 MICHAEL GRUENBERGER & ADOLF DIETZ, INT’L
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE GER § 7 (Paul Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed.,
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 31st ed. 2019).
87
§ 106A(a).
88
§ 106A(a)(1)(A).
78
79
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character or reputation.89 Once an author exercises the right of attribution,
another’s failure to mention the author’s name in relation to his or her work may
give rise to an infringement of the right.90 Copyright laws in France, Germany, and
Italy include similar terms but additionally specify that an author can publish a
work anonymously or by using a pseudonym of the author’s choice.91
The right of integrity under VARA permits visual artists to prohibit
intentional defacement, distortion, or modification of their work when doing so
would damage their artistic identity, even after transferring title to the art.92
However, artists can only prevent destruction of works of “recognized stature.”93
Whether a piece of art achieves this stature depends generally on its artistic quality
and recognition by a relevant artistic community.94 Any “intentional or grossly
negligent destruction” of this type of work violates the author’s right.95
French law recognizes the right of integrity as “the right to respect for [the
author’s] name, his authorship, and his work.”96 French authors or artists can assert
this right without proving that their honor or reputation would be prejudiced, nor
must they justify their reasons for preventing an act they believe would prejudice
them.97 Accordingly, “French law specifically seeks to preclude the public, third
parties, or the courts from substituting their choices or value judgments for the
author’s concerning whether modifications of his work might be fitting.”98 German
law, on the other hand, requires the author to show some harm or threat to his or
her interests,99 but the German Copyright Act recognizes these interests not just in
terms of the author’s honor and reputation, but also in terms of the author’s other
intellectual or personal interests in a work.100
VARA also provides limiting guidelines addressing situations in which an
artist’s work is incorporated into a building. Even if artwork incorporated in a part
of a building cannot be removed from the building without “destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work,” no rights under VARA apply if the
artist consented to the work’s installation either before VARA’s effective date or
in a writing signed by the building owner specifying that the installation may
§ 106A(a)(1)(B).
Id.
91
1 PASCAL KAMINA ET AL., supra note 86, INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE FRA § 7 (Paul
Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 31st ed.
2019); 2 INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE GER, supra note 85; 2 INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE ITA, supra note 86.
92
§ 106A(a)(3)(A).
93
§ 106A(a)(3)(B).
94
Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020).
95
§ 106A(a)(3)(B).
96
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] [INTELLECTUAL PROP. CODE] art. L121-1 (Fr.),
translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE (WIPO 2003).
97
1 PASCAL KAMINA ET AL., supra note 86, INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE FRA § 7 (Paul
Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 31st ed.
2019).
98
Id.
99
2 MICHAEL GRUENBERGER & ADOLF DIETZ, supra note 86, INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
GER § 7 (Paul Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc. 31st ed. 2019).
100
Id.
89
90
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subject the work to harm upon removal.101 If a property owner seeks removal of
art from a building when doing so can occur without damage or modification, an
artist’s moral rights prevail; however, the statute also lists two possible exceptions
to this VARA protection.102 The first exception prevents VARA protection if “the
owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify the author
of the owner’s intended action affecting the work of visual art.”103 The second
exception also denies VARA security if “the owner did provide such notice in
writing and the person so notified failed, within 90 days after receiving such notice,
either to remove the work or to pay for its removal.”104
In terms of the duration of rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act,
protection for most works lasts only as long as the life of the artist.105 If more than
one artist created a work, the rights withstand as long as the life of the last surviving
author.106 VARA rights cannot be transferred to another person, but they can be
waived in general in a written instrument signed by the author.107 In contrast,
French and Italian moral rights are perpetual. 108 Upon an author’s death, the rights
of attribution and integrity are transferred to the author’s heirs or descendants, who
can then exercise the rights without time limitation, even after the work falls into
the public domain.109 Moral rights are not perpetual in Germany, but they do not
expire until seventy years after the death of the author or the last surviving
coauthor.110
Compared to foreign legislation, protection of moral rights in the United
States is limited in scope, length, and application. While relevant provisions in
French law, which are often referenced as affording incredibly liberal security to
moral rights, may not fit well in the United States legal system, a happy medium
between the systems would provide more satisfactory protection for deserving
artists and authors.
C. Resolutions for Infringement
Upon sufficiently establishing a violation of the Visual Artists Rights Act,
an injured party can recover either actual or statutory damages.111 Ordinarily,
statutory damages range from $750 to $30,000 per work, unless the injured party
17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2020).
§ 113(d)(2).
103
§ 113(d)(2)(A).
104
§ 113(d)(2)(B).
105
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 1990 WL 258818.
106
§ 106A(d)(3).
107
§ 106A(e)(1).
108
2 VALERIA FALCE ET AL., supra note 86, INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE ITA § 7 (Paul
Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 31st ed.
2019); 1 PASCAL KAMINA ET AL., INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE FRA § 7 (Paul Edward Geller
Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 31st ed. 2019).
109
Id.
110
2 MICHAEL GRUENBERGER & ADOLF DIETZ, supra note 86, INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
GER § 7 (Paul Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc. 31st ed. 2019).
111
§ 504(a)(1)-(2).
101
102
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proves a violation was “willful.”112 In the case of a willful violation, the statute
authorizes statutory damages up to $150,000 per work.113
Foreign laws also specify possible damages for moral rights
infringements. German law even provides that anyone who negligently or
intentionally invades another’s moral rights must compensate the injured party “for
the prejudice suffered as a result of the infringement.”114 The calculation of
damages may be influenced by profits gained by the infringer as a result of the
violation or “the amount the infringer would have had to pay in equitable
remuneration if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the right
infringed.”115 Certain rightsholders may also receive compensation for nonpecuniary damages to the extent that is equitable.116 German law additionally
specifies potential criminal penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine
for infringing upon, or attempting to infringe upon, an artist’s right of attribution.117
The same punishment is available for any distribution, communication, adaptation,
or reproduction of a work without permission of the author.118
In France, an infringer may be charged with a criminal offense of up to
three years’ imprisonment or a fine up to €300,000 ($353,700).119 An organized
group guilty of a violation is subject to five years’ imprisonment or a maximum
€500,000 ($592,120) fine.120 Additional sanctions are also possible in the presence
of aggravating circumstances.121 Further, in Italy, an intentional infringement of
the right of authorship or integrity is punishable by up to a year in prison or a fine
of not less than 1,000,000 lire ($1,363,077).122 If such a violation was negligent,
only a fine of up to 2,000,000 lire ($2,726,154) may be imposed.123
Regardless of the amount of monetary compensation available
internationally, the potential for criminal sanctions in these countries indicates the
significant value they attribute to moral rights. Imposing criminal punishment for
these infringements may not be realistically possible in the United States due to
our historic propensity to limit legal protection of creative works, but the
importance of moral rights and the variety of benefits of the creation of artwork in

§ 504(c)(1), (2).
§ 504(c)(2).
114
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [URHG] [ACT ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS] Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL
I at 1273, § 97(1) (Ger.).
115
Id. § 97(2).
116
Id.
117
Id. § 107(1).
118
Id. § 106(1).
119
CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] [INTELLECTUAL PROP. CODE] art. L335-2 (Fr.),
translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE (WIPO 2003).
120
Id.
121
JEAN-MATHIEU BERTHO & AURÉLIE ROBERT, supra note 86, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION IN FRANCE:
OVERVIEW, Thomas Reuters Practical Law (database updated Oct. 2018).
122
LEGGE 22 aprile 1941, n.633, art. 171 (It.).
123
Id. at art. 172.
112
113
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general nevertheless calls for greater protection.
III. CASTILLO v. G&M REALTY L.P.
Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P. marks the first time an artist or group of artists
has attempted to state a claim under the Visual Artists Rights Act for works of
aerosol art or, more specifically, graffiti art.124 The 5Pointz artists specifically
asserted violations of their moral rights to the integrity of their work. The case
eventually made its way to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit but not before encountering several obstacles.
A. Procedural History
The legal history of 5Pointz began in 2013.125 After being denied a petition
for the site to be designated as a landmark, seventeen graffiti artists filed suit under
VARA to prevent its destruction.126 The artists sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent property owner Gerald Wolkoff from tearing down the buildings to erect
two luxury apartment buildings in their place.127
Less than a month later, the court issued a minute order that denied the
preliminary injunction and indicated that a full written opinion from Judge Frederic
Block would soon be released.128 The opinion followed just eight days later, but,
within this short time, Wolkoff denied the artists access to the site and ordered the
whitewashing of the art—without formally notifying the artists.129 The evidence
suggests that Wolkoff knew at the time that VARA would have otherwise required
him to give 90 days’ notice to the artists to salvage some of the work that the court
previously deemed removable.130
However, because Judge Block’s opinion indicated the potential for
significant monetary damages if a trial court were to determine that the artwork
achieved recognized stature under VARA,131 the artists amended their complaint
in 2014.132 Accordingly, they alleged that their work achieved such recognized
stature and that Wolkoff’s whitewashing qualified as a willful violation of their
statutory rights.133 In 2015, ten other artists filed a separate lawsuit against Wolkoff
and consolidated both claims into Castillo.134
Ultimately, the district court held that the art possessed recognized
See Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020).
See generally Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
126
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for a Temp. Restraining Order &
Preliminary Injunction, Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., No. 13-5612 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013).
127
Id.
128
Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
129
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163.
130
Id. at 164; see also § 113(d)(2)(B).
131
Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
132
Second Amended Complaint, Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., No. 13-5612 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2014).
133
Id.
134
See Complaint, Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., No. 15-3230 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015).
124
125
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stature.135 The court relied heavily upon expert testimony in favor of the quality
and recognition of the 5Pointz art, along with testimony explaining the prominence
of graffiti in the art world.136 It even noted that VARA defends temporary art from
destruction.137 Additionally, the court found that Wolkoff intentionally demolished
the 5Pointz art.138 Though the district court found actual damages to be inadequate
under the circumstances, it did analyze statutory damages for the infringement.139
It awarded $6.75 million—the maximum amount of statutory damages allowed by
VARA—for the demolished work.140
Wolkoff and his company, G&M Realty, then appealed the judgment,141
and in February 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld, for the first time, that the work of an exterior aerosol artist is deserving of
legal protection.142
B. Analysis and Holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit
After reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment.143 Wolkoff contested the district court’s conclusion that the graffiti
art at 5Pointz, some of which was inherently temporary, achieved “recognized
stature.”144 Yet, no provision in VARA explicitly prohibits temporary artwork
from reaching this stature, and Wolkoff’s own expert witness testified that a work’s
temporary nature does not preclude it from achieving “recognized stature.”145
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
acknowledged the emergence of street art as a valuable and culturally significant
form of contemporary art, specifically referencing the work of famous street artist
Banksy146 as such that would be considered of “recognized stature.”147 For these
reasons, along with expert testimony attesting to the high artistic quality of the
5Pointz art, the court upheld the district court’s decision to acknowledge the
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 170.
Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22.
137
Id. at 226.
138
Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
139
Id. at 445. “When determining the amount of statutory damages to award for copyright
infringement, courts consider: (1) the infringer's state of mind, (2) the expenses saved, and profits
earned, by the infringer, (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder, (4) the deterrent effect on the
infringer and third parties, (5) the infringer's cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value
of the infringing material, and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties.” § 504(c).
140
Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 447.
141
Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2020).
142
Id. at 164.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 167.
145
Id.
146
See Will Ellsworth-Jones, The Story Behind Banksy, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Feb. 2013),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-story-behind-banksy-4310304/ (detailing the
anonymous British graffiti artist’s famed career leading to his Time magazine selection for one of the
world’s 100 most influential people in 2010).
147
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 167-68.
135
136
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5Pointz graffiti art as attaining “recognized stature.”148
Wolkoff’s deliberate behavior was also crucial in determining the outcome
of this conflict. Solely because his actions constituted a willful violation of VARA,
both the district and appellate courts imposed additional statutory damages against
Wolkoff.149 He gave conflicting, untrue statements in his affidavit and testimony
regarding the necessary start date for demolition of the building.150 Then, having
no sincere business reason to do so, he whitewashed the art from the site in an “act
of pure pique and revenge.”151 The district court further elaborated on Wolkoff’s
state of mind, noting that as an experienced real estate developer, he showed a
willingness “to run the risk of being held liable for substantial statutory damages
rather than to jeopardize his multimillion-dollar luxury condo project.”152 The
damages accumulated to a maximum amount of $6.75 million and served
simultaneously as compensation for the loss of distinguished artwork and
deterrence against an intentional infringement upon artists’ rights.153
IV. CONCLUSION
Castillo highlights much of the controversy that has developed throughout
the existence of the Visual Artists Rights Act. The original purpose of the statute
was to expand moral rights protection in the United States,154 but VARA’s
excessive limitations have impeded its ability to truly achieve that goal.
Most notably, Castillo demands an expansion of the definition of a “work
of visual art” under VARA. Judge Barrington Parker recognized graffiti not just as
a rising form of contemporary art, but also as a type of “high art.”155 Though not
specifically enumerated in the statute as a “work of visual art,” graffiti art
surpassed VARA’s limitations and loopholes in Castillo and earned the protection
it deserves. Yet, the rarity of this case invites inquiry into other impressive and
impactful works of art that could have been destroyed or damaged without
reparation because of VARA’s exclusivity. In order to avoid future denial of
protection to such artwork, VARA’s definition of a “work of visual art” should be
amended to more closely mirror the statutory language of international legislation.
The Italian Copyright Act, for example, affords moral rights to artists of “works of
sculpture, painting, drawing, engraving and similar figurative arts, including
scenic art.”156 This language leaves more adequate space for protection of works
that do not fit within the narrowest characterization of art.
To accompany a broader definition of visual art, extension of the duration
of rights under VARA would also allow for more sufficient moral rights protection.
Id. at 167-69.
Id. at 162.
150
Id. at 164.
151
Id. at 172.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 1990 WL 258818.
155
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 167.
156
LEGGE 22 aprile 1941, n.633, art. 2 (It.).
148
149

Published by UMKC School of Law Institutional Repository, 2021

15

UMKC Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 [2021], Art. 22

1034

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:4

In the United States, Congress touted the “special societal need”157 for the works
of art protected by the statute, but it failed to allow protection for longer than the
life of the artist. Without changing the law so far as to afford perpetual moral rights,
like in Italy or France, VARA should be amended to allow protection to last for a
defined number of years after the artist’s death—perhaps seventy years, as is the
law in Germany.158
Both the Visual Artists Rights Act and Castillo have evoked intense
reactions—such as triumph, pride, disdain, and even outright disgust—from a
variety of people and communities.159 The art community has celebrated the
Castillo decision and its enforcement of VARA. Conversely, a large part of the
legal community in the United States has scrutinized the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit for its holding. Much of their contention stems from
traditional United States legal principles honoring contracts and property law.160
Outside of the legal community, the Daily News Editorial Board, labeling the art
as “vandalism that would otherwise be illegal,” even called the decision “a frontal
assault on property rights.”161 However, VARA explicitly provides provisions
balancing—not exclusively honoring—the artists’ rights with those of a property
owner.162 Only because of Wolkoff’s impudence in prematurely whitewashing
5Pointz were the artists able to receive $6.75 million in damages.163
Awareness and understanding of adequate moral rights protection under
VARA are even more imperative in light of recent events. On July 20, 2020,
Wolkoff’s counsel filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States.164 In their attempt to invalidate Castillo, they suggested that Congress never
had the power to enact the Visual Artists Rights Act, claiming that moral rights
fail to serve the following copyright objectives: (1) rewarding copyright owners
any rightful financial compensation for their work, and (2) encouraging the
creation or dissemination of useful art.165 Perhaps less obvious to those engulfed
in highly technical legal research and analysis, though, many types of art actually
have a profound impact on our society.166 Even after its destruction, 5Pointz has
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 at 6915.
2 MICHAEL GRUENBERGER & ADOLF DIETZ, supra note 86, INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
GER § 7 (Paul Edward Geller Int’l Copyright Law and Practice ed., Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc. 31st ed. 2019).
159
See Louise Carron, Case Review of the 5Pointz Appeal: Castillo et al. v. G&M Realty L.P. (2020),
CENTER FOR ART LAW, https://itsartlaw.org/2020/03/02/case-review-castillo-et-al-v-gm-realty-l-p/
(Mar. 2, 2020); Daily News Editorial Board, Paint That a Shame: The Crazy Precedent Set by a
5Pointz Appeals Ruling, DAILY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/nyedit-graffiti-is-illegal-20200226-n6chh5ijgvahzavxkns3ymr6ny-story.html; Cathay Y.N. Smith,
Community Rights to Public Art, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 369 (2016).
160
See generally Drew Thornley, The Visual Artists Rights Act's "Recognized Stature" Provision: A
Case for Repeal, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351 (2019).
161
Paint That a Shame, supra note 159.
162
See § 113(d)(1)-(2).
163
Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
164
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Castillo v. G&M Realty, 950 F.3d 155 (2020) (No. 20-66).
165
Id. at 5-6.
166
GEOFFREY CROSSICK & PTRYCJA KASZYNSKA, UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF ARTS & CULTURE 1,
60, 86, 74, 103 (Arts & Humanities Research Council, 2016) (indicating a connection between civic
engagement and the arts; reporting that creative industries account for 1.71 million jobs; linking art
157
158
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continued to significantly affect local and outside communities.167 Congress has
explicit Constitutional power to promote the creation of such “useful” and
impactful art.168 Accordingly, artists should be able to claim and protect their art,
just like any other tangible or intellectual property owner.
The writ also indicated that the difficulty of determining whether a work
of art achieves “recognized stature” violates the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause.169 It claimed that the statute’s absence of an explicit definition of
“recognized stature” “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of what is prohibited.”170 While courts have employed more than one approach to
proving “recognized stature,” the district court noted that the variety of exhibits
and credible testimony presented by the artists proved the 5Pointz art achieved the
necessary status “even under the most restrictive of evidentiary standards.”171 The
petitioners’ “void for vagueness” argument carries even less weight when
considering the otherwise incredibly narrow nature of the statute. Currently, art
must meet very specific criteria in order to even qualify as a “work of visual art,”
so the issue of whether a work would achieve “recognized stature” would likely
not be a difficult one to solve with the help of research and expert witnesses.
Perhaps Congress purposefully left the term undefined for this reason, or maybe it
wanted to allow broad interpretation from courts given the restricted applicability
of VARA. The petitioners failed to recognize that judicial interpretation is not, in
its essence, an infringement upon the separation of powers. Thankfully, on October
5, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the petitioners’ writ of certiorari.172 Still,
without any legislative action, the fight for increased moral rights protection in the
United States continues.
Art of any kind, including visual art, is meant to be a fluid concept subject
to different interpretations from different people with different perspectives.
Though art may be difficult to quantify in any legal system, its value and impact
on society, which are gifted to us by the artists themselves, justify its protection.
To see the 5Pointz art and hear the words of its creators and admirers is to
understand the effort, inspiration, and power behind each piece. Castillo and the
graffiti artists involved in the case deserve to be protected by the Visual Artists
Rights Act. 5Pointz is gone, but with necessary changes to VARA, the future of
and cultural activity to economic and urban regeneration; and identifying one report of multiple
clinical benefits in a hospital that integrated visual arts in its new design).
167
Laura Hard, 5 Years Ago, Their 5Pointz Art Was Erased. Now There’s a Museum for It, N.Y.
TIMES, (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/nyregion/5pointz-street-art-graffitimuseum-nyc.html (referencing the Museum of Street Art now located in Lower Manhattan honoring
the history and meaning of 5Pointz and showcasing work from 20 original 5Pointz artists); see
generally Geoff Cobb, The Tragic Death and Lasting Legacy of Five Pointz, GREENPOINTERS
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://greenpointers.com/2019/04/30/the-tragic-death-and-lasting-legacy-of-fivepointz/.
168
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
169
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 164, at 6.
170
Id.
171
Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
172
G&M Realty L.P. v. Castillo, No. 20-66, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 4495 (2d. Cir., Feb. 20, 2020), cert.
denied.
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art in the eyes of the law can be as bright as the white walls that helped secure the
artists’ rightful victory.
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